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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE W. PRESTON 
* 
Plaintiff and * Appellant 
* 
vs. REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S 
* LORNA A. PRESTON No. 17597 
* Defendant and 
Respondent * 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Robert w. Gutke 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Findley P. Gridley 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE W. PRESTON 
* 
Plaintiff and * Appellant 
* 
vs. REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
* 
LORNA A. PRESTON No. 17597 
* 
Defendant and 
Respondent * 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court, in fact, constituted an abuse of discre-
tion. 
It is conceded that trial courts have broad discretion but 
that discretion is predicated upon a fair equitable division 
necessary for the protection of the parties, Berry v. Berry 
filed July 30, 1981, No. 17165. 
Bear Lake Cabin 
The Defendant's Brief ignores the undisputed testimony and 
Exhibit #7 regarding Plaintiff's contribution to the cabin of 
$9,310.93. This unchallenged evidence should be given credence 
by any trial court without requiring the court to exercise the 
"wisdom of King Solomon", especially in view of the fact that 
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the same trier of fact was reversed by this court in the recent 
case of Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 P.2d 193, dated March 12, 
1974. This court required the same trial court to give credit 
for prior owned property in a case similar to this case. 
Plaintiff asks not for the wisdom of Solomon but only for equal 
and fair administration of justice. The trial court awarded 
each party the property they owned prior to marriage but only 
applied the rule to the Defendant. The trial court divided the 
property acquired through the husband's efforts with the wife 
but then failed to divide the wife's acquired property with the 
husband. These acts are not merely on an oversight, but consti-
tute a clear abuse of discretion. 
Farm Property 
Respondent refers to the argument of Plaintiff as 
"tit-for-tat" logic that Plaintiff should have one-half of the 
farm. Defendant, in effect is saying that the female in a 
divorce is entitled to concessions not available to the male. 
The recently decided case of Berry v. Berry filed July 30, 1981 
approved the award to the wife of a 50% interest in the 
husband's farm partnership but reversed upon other grounds. 
Certainly the reverse of this award to a husband cannot be an 
unreasonable proposition. 
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During the marriage Plaintiff supported the Defendant and 
her children to a large degree. He performed legal services for 
her and was instrumental in Defendant acquiring the farm and 
also the acquisition of a share in excess of her inheritance. 
He worked on the land improving it and raising the cattle 
located thereon. The trial court awarded the Defendant all pro-
perty she had before marriage or that was inherited during 
marriage. No distinction was drawn between the two classes of 
property. That failure by the court resulted in an award to the 
Defendant of between $204,000 to $305,000 and a division between 
the parties of about 9% to the Plaintiff and 91% to the 
Defendant, wife. Such inequity can hardly be termed a tit-for-
tat argument. 
Personal Property. A fair reading of the transcript 
reveals that the Defendant, in obvious violation of the order of 
Judge Gould, removed all the property acquired by the parties 
during marriage from the house of the Plaintiff. 
The trial court found her in contempt then awarded the pro-
perty to her, with a few exceptions. The message to the bar and 
public is obvious: Violation of a court's order benefits the 
violator. This decision would prompt the bar and parties to act 
in willful disregard of a court order as it bestows a gain to 
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the party with no penalty. It seems only logical to assume that 
the law would not intend this result. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent's Brief fails to address the issues pre-
sented, lt ignores the inequities of the trial court's decisions 
by the statement to the effect that the record sustains the 
Judge's findings and the Judge should not be required to exer-
cise the wisdom of Solomon. The record does not support the 
findings of the Court which are inconsistent with each other. 
The trial court announced a provision then applied it dif-
ferently to each party. The trial Court was not expected to 
have the wisdom of Solomon, but it was expected to have abided 
by this court's prior decisions, to have exercised sound discre-
tion, and to have applied the law fairly to both parties. 
DATED this .;:?C day of August, 1981. 
HARRIS, PRESTON & GUTKE 
By:~tJ.~ 
Robert w. Gutke 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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